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Abstract
While an emerging literature cites weather shocks as migration determinants, scant
evidence exists on how such migration impacts the markets of receiving communities
in developing countries. We address this knowledge gap by investigating the impact
of weather-driven internal migration on labor markets in Nepal. An increase of 1
percentage point in net migration reduces wages in the formal sector by 4.8 percentage
points. The absence of wage effects in the informal sector is consistent with the exit
of low-skilled native workers from the labor market. Understanding entrepreneurial
constraints and drivers of labor market exits will inform pathways to resilience.
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Migration is understood to be a key mode of adaptation to extreme climatic events (IPCC
(2014)). Rural workers search for employment elsewhere to mitigate income losses tem-
porarily or move permanently if the damages are severe (Halliday (2006);Feng et al. (2010);
Dillion et al. (2011); Gray and Mueller (2012b) Gray and Mueller (2012a); Marchiori et al.
(2012); Gray and Bilsborrow. (2013); Bohra-Mishra et al. (2014); Mueller et al. (2014)). An
emerging challenge in the climate change debate is to reconcile whether such adaptation
bears additional consequences for human security and livelihoods (IPCC (2014)).
Studies of the consequences of migratory flows on the labor markets of hosting com-
munities in industrialized countries are ubiquitous (Card (1990);Card (2005); Borjas (2005);
Borjas (2006); Boustan et al. (2010); Ottaviano and Peri (2012); Pugatch and Yang (2011)).
In developing countries, the issue has been investigated from the perspectives of either the
migrants(Beegle et al. (2011); Grogger and Hanson (2011); De Brauw et al. (2013)), their
countries of origin (Adams and Page (2005); Hanson (2009), for a review), or the households
directly linked to migrants (Woodruff and Zenteno (2007); Yang (2008)). Scant evidence ex-
ists on how internal migration impacts the labor markets of receiving communities in develop-
ing countries, let alone the implications of disaster-driven migration (Kleemans and Magruder
(2012); El Badaoui et al. (2014); Strobl and Valfort (2013)). We address this knowledge
gap by investigating the impact of weather-driven migration on internal labor markets in a
conflict-prone country, Nepal.
Standard models predict immigration is detrimental to workers that show high degree of
substitutability with migrants (Johnson (1980a); Johnson (1980b); Altonji and Card (1991);
Borjas (2003); Card and Lemieux (2001); Borjas and Katz (2007); Ottaviano and Peri (2012)).
Migrants are implicitly assumed to be low skilled and to substitute natives with compara-
ble skills. Recent work in Uganda supports these assertions (Strobl and Valfort (2013)).
Elsewhere, migrants are characterized as highly skilled, yet displace low-skilled workers
(Kleemans and Magruder (2012)). Kleemans and Magruder (2012) speculated that binding
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constraints (such as minimum wage laws) in the formal sector can create a wedge between
formal- and informal-sector wages. These conditions further render substitution effects more
pronounced among disadvantaged natives. Thus, immigration displaces low-skilled workers,
causing a decline in the wages of (less educated) native workers predominantly employed in
the informal sector (Kleemans and Magruder (2012)).
Exposure to civil war1 and environmental degradation, and the linkages of these factors
to rural-urban migration2 render Nepal an interesting context in which to study the spillover
effects of adaptation, with a direct focus on nearby labor markets. We apply the method-
ology of Boustan et al. (2010) to address biases inherent in the immigration literature: the
self-selection of migrants at origin, the selection of migrant destinations, and native displace-
ments. The methodology allows for the full exploitation of bilateral migration flows in order
to identify plausibly exogenous push factors at origin and pull factors at destination. The
instruments for the net migration rate (predicted in-migration and out-migration rates) in
the wage regression are based on multiples of the predicted probability of moving bilaterally
from one district to another and the predicted bilateral (in- and out-) migration flows. These
two factors are predicted using models prior to the first stage. The first stage then uses two
sets of instruments for net migration: the constructed in- and out-migration rates jointly and
the net-migration rate derived from subtracting the first instrument from the first. This is
in direct contrast to earlier work which uses spatially lagged weather shocks as instruments,
raising concerns regarding the validity of the exclusion restriction due to spatial spillovers
resulting from these shocks.3
We provide a few modifications to the Boustan et al. (2010) methodology to improve
1 Urbanization and labor markets have been affected by conflicts in other settings (Kondylis (2010);
Maystadt and Verwimp (2014); Alix-Garcia and Bartlett (2012); Alix-Garcia et al. (2013)).
2 Environmental degradation and weather shocks have been argued to increase rural-urban migration in
Nepal (Shrestha and Bhandari (2007); Massey et al. (2010)).
3 The problem of spatial spillovers is less of an issue when using approximations of shocks at origin to
study international migration (Munshi (2003); Pugatch and Yang (2011)), since shocks occur outside the
labor markets under investigation and the existence of spatial spillovers can be directly tested. In our study
of internal migration in Nepal, we will nonetheless follow Pugatch and Yang (2011) to directly test the
existence of spatial spillovers.
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identification and adapt the methodology to the contextual setting of our study. First,
we model out- and in- migration flows between districts in Nepal (which are later used to
construct our instruments), accounting for lagged weather anomalies, in addition to conflict
and historical migration flows, and their interactions with river density. Thus, we expand
on the push-pull factors previously considered in the migration literature while introducing
a dynamic estimation framework. Controlling for historical migration flows is crucial to
decipher the relative importance of natural disasters and conflict events on immigration
consequences. Second, we differentiate consequences on the labor market by native worker
skills to interpret the empirical findings in relation to theoretical predictions in the literature
(Altonji and Card (1991); Kleemans and Magruder (2012)).
Our dynamic model of out-migration (estimated prior to the first stage) indicates weather
extremes are a prominent driver of out-migration in Nepal, corroborating earlier work on
environmental migration patterns (Gray and Mueller (2012a), Mueller et al. (2014)). An
increase by 1 standard deviation in the exposure to floods (droughts) reduces out-migration
rates by approximately 18 percent (20 percent) in areas with mean river density. The effect
of flooding is reversed for individuals in areas densely populated with rivers. Increasing the
number of conflict events by 1 standard deviation also encourages out-migration to a lower
degree, by 6 percent.
Incorporating historical migration rates in a dynamic model provides two interesting
perspectives. First, including auxiliary controls is crucial in the environmental migration
literature, as their omission can bias parameter estimates. Second, it suggests that weather
extremes are of equal importance to these omitted factors. An increase of 1 standard de-
viation in the lagged out-migration rate increases future out-migration rates by about 22
percent. The corresponding increase for in-migration rates is even larger (at about 62 per-
cent), reflecting strong network effects.
We find such prevailing factors push a more distinct group of individuals to migrate
(Kleemans and Magruder (2012); Strobl and Valfort (2013)). Approximately half of the
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migrant population had completed 10 years of schooling, relative to 18 percent of natives, in
2010. These high-skilled migrants potentially saturate the formal sector, where one-fourth of
natives are employed. These marked imbalances between the characteristics of the migrants
and of the native population accentuate wage effects in the formal sector: an increase of
1 percentage point in net migration reduces wages in the formal sector by 4.8 percentage
points4.
Wage effects are concentrated in the formal sector, despite observed reductions in the
employment of natives in the informal sector. The absence of wage effects in the informal
sector is consistent with the exit of native workers from the informal labor market. We
additionally show immigration largely leads to the unemployment of low-skilled natives. An
increase of 1 percentage point in net migration leads to an increase of 1.5 percentage points
in the unemployment of unskilled workers.
Our findings have implications for both the immigration and environmental migration
literatures. First, migration is found to strongly affect labor outcomes in hosting districts in
Nepal. While migrants bring skills to host economies, their presence depresses the wages of
workers in the formal sector (in contrast to the findings of Kleemans and Magruder (2012)
in Indonesia) and causes workers to exit the labor market altogether. Second, our results
suggest vulnerability to weather extremes is not limited to those at the source of exposure.
Conflict and flooding in areas populated by rivers displace people. The vulnerability of
populations in external communities has spillover effects on migrant hubs. If the highly
skilled workers are most affected, reductions in their purchasing power likely incur losses
to providers of their services and goods. Understanding the constraints migrants face in
starting their own enterprises and the drivers of labor market exits among the low-skilled
natives will inform pathways to labor market resilience.
4Kleemans and Magruder (2012) report an increase in th migrant share of the population by 1 per-
centage point reduces overall income by 1.9 percentage points. Similarly, Altonji and Card (1991) and
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) find 1-2 percent declines in wages among low-skilled workers in the U.S. Our
results are just over double in magnitude.
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2 Vulnerability and Labor Market Conditions in Nepal
Flooding is not uncommon in Nepal and can potentially lead to an increase in migration,
away from rivers and toward low-lying land (Banister and Thapa (1981); Shrestha (1999);
Massey et al. (2010)). Our analysis covers periods of unprecedented increases in the fre-
quency and severity of floods and landslides (Figure 2.1). Small-scale floods occurred (prior
to 2002) followed by widespread exposure (in 47 districts), displacing hundreds of thou-
sands by 2002 (UN report 2002). The 2007 floods displaced more than 19,000 households
(Dartmouth Flood ObservatoryDartmouth Flood Observatory (2014) data and the Inter-
national Disaster Database,CRED (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters)
(2014)). A flood of an even larger magnitude occurred in eastern Nepal in 2008 as a result of
a breach in an embankment at the Indo-Nepali border, displacing 42,000 households across
several villages (UN Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2008)). Flooding
and landslides affected the far western and midwest regions during the heavy monsoon pe-
riod of 2009: 4,000 households were displaced and the food stock of 25,000 families lost
(UN Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2009)).
Drought risk is rare and tends to occur during the winter, the regular monsoon period.
Western and eastern Nepal have experienced episodes of consecutive droughts since 20005.
These culminated in a severe drought over the period November 2008 to February 2009, with
precipitation 50 percent below the seasonal average (Wang et al. (2013)).
Civil conflict was also a major factor driving migration in Nepal from 1999 to 2006
(Bohra-Mishra (2011)). A Maoist insurgency began in the Rolpa district in western Nepal
and much of the conflict was concentrated in mountainous and hilly terrain, and in poorer
areas. The decade-long conflict led to the loss of more than 13,000 lives (Do and Iyer (2010)).
There was considerable variation in the intensity of conflict across the country;6 the Maoists
controlled several districts in eastern and western Nepal by 2005 (Murshed and Gates (2005)).
5 See Figure A.1 in the appendix.
6 See Figure A.2 in the appendix.
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Violent outbreaks led to the movement of political refugees away from conflict-prone areas.
The predicted probability of migration decreased for moderate levels of violence and increased
as violence became more intense (Bohra-Mishra (2011)).
Local migration in Nepal driven by environmental and political factors is concentrated
among more skilled and educated workers. Massey et al. (2010) found that environmental
decay, as indicated by falling agricultural productivity, serves to increase the odds of local
migration. Specifically, the odds of moving are significantly higher for individuals with more
years of schooling and holding salaried occupations, which is likely to indicate greater skill
and therefore greater potential returns on human capital from migration. Among locally
migrating adult males in Nepal compared with non migrants, the former are younger and
more educated (Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013)). Similar to environmentally driven migration,
within conflict areas, migrants who move both within and across districts tend to be younger
and more educated, and to hold salaried jobs (Bohra-Mishra (2011)). These disparities across
movers and nonmovers increase when migration is across districts.
The above migration trends suggest displacement associated with environmental disasters
explains only a small portion of the mobility patterns in Nepal. Acknowledging additional
push-pull factors, such as conflict and economic drivers, is crucial to provide an unbiased
understanding of migration and its consequences on neighboring districts. This fact influ-
ences our decision to modify the Boustan et al. (2010) identification strategy to incorporate
conflict and a dynamic component to proxy additional drivers of migration.
Previous work on environmental and conflict displacement suggests the relatively skilled
will tend to move out of district. Our study focuses on between-district migration and
classifying workers by sector in our LSMS data, we observe both migrants and non migrants
tend to be employed in the informal sector (Table 2.1). However, the share of migrants
employed in the formal sector is larger than the share of non migrants in this sector. A greater
proportion engage in service-sector work; 39 percent of migrants compared to 17 percent
of non migrants in 2003 (Table 2.1). Non migrants are also disproportionately employed
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in agriculture. While the agricultural sector remains an important contributor to Nepal′s
economy, from 1965 to 2010, the share of gross domestic product accounted for by agriculture
fell from 70 percent to 30 percent, while the share accounted for by services increased from 20
percent to more than 50 percent (International Labor Organization (2010)). These trends
suggest that immigration is likely to affect services, the sector that employs the greatest
share of migrants. Moreover, labor market adjustments following a shift in labor supply may
be constrained given the declining role of agriculture in the economy.
3 Data
Our analysis draws from several data sources. First, migration and employment data
are taken from two waves of the nationally representative Nepal Living Standards Survey
(NLSS): 2003 and 2010. Second, we use the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset
(ACLED), which documents georeferenced conflict events through 2010, to measure conflict
exposure. Third, to create weather anomaly variables, we use 1×1 degree gridded satellite-
based weather data provided by the POWER (Predicted of Worldwide Energy Resource)
project of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) of the United States
for the years 1981 to 2013 (US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2014)).
Fourth, gridded population data are extrapolated from the Center for International Earth
Science Information Network at Columbia University. Fifth, river networks and geographic
characteristics (such as distance) are extracted from the United States Geological Survey
HydroSHEDS (Hydrological Data and Maps Based on Shuttle Elevation Derivatives at Mul-
tiple Scales dataset). 7 Below we elaborate on how our outcomes and explanatory variables
are constructed from the aforementioned datasets.
7 The data source is: http : //hydrosheds.cr.usgs.gov/index.php.
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3.1 Definition of Variables
3.1.1 Migration
We create migration flows using the migration information of 7,000 and 14,000 individuals
(residing in 3,954 and 5,556 households in 69 districts8) in 2003 and 2010, respectively.
Inflows are based on individuals who reported moving to district k from district j in year t
using NLSS sampling weights for population-based inferences. Bilateral migration outflows
are similarly defined. We restrict our focus to inflows and outflows for four years preceding
the 2003 and 2010 surveys to minimize the impact of recall bias and ensure sufficient coverage
of conflict and weather events in the period observed.9 Population figures derived from the
1995 NLSS are then used to further convert the migration flows into shares of migrants
moving into and out of each district k from each district j for each year. This procedure
creates two 69×69 matrices of bilateral in- and out-migration rates at the district level, which
are used to predict net migration rates, the key variable for the identification of the impact
of migration in the labor regressions.
3.1.2 Conflict
A conflict event is defined as a single altercation in which one or more groups use force for a
political end (Raleigh et al. (2010)). Following this definition, the number of conflict events
per square kilometer is defined by district-year for the four years prior to 2003 and 2010.
Between 1996 and 2006, the end of the civil war, about 3,030 conflict events were reported
in the ACLED dataset for Nepal.
8 In total, six districts are excluded from our panel because they were omitted from the 2003 and 2010
surveys. In 2003, Accham, Mustang, and Rasuwa districts were unreachable due to conflict. Dolpa, Ilam,
and Manang districts were omitted in 2010.




We create seasonal flood and drought indicator variables, for the same period covering migra-
tion flows, for each 1×1 degree grid that overlaps a district in a given year. Heavy monsoon
is from June to September. Regular monsoon is from November in the previous year through
February of the current year. A flood shock indicator, for each grid in a given year, is set
to 1 if cumulative rainfall over the heavy monsoon season exceeds the 90th percentile of the
time-series distribution. Similarly, a drought shock indicator, for each grid in a given year, is
set to 1 if cumulative rainfall over the regular monsoon season falls below the 10th percentile
of the distribution.
Annual district-level flood and drought indicators are set to 1 if a flood or drought occurs
in any grid overlapping the district. The flood and drought variables are interacted with
river density data to capture an additional dimension of district exposure to the weather
anomalies. River density is calculated as the length of the river segments in kilometers
divided by each district area.
3.1.4 Labor Market Outcomes
Our labor supply variables focus on the employment status of the individual. An individual
is considered employed if he reported working in the last 12 months prior to the survey
interview. Otherwise, the individual is categorized as unemployed (did not work nor engage
in domestic activities in the last 12 months) or inactive (did engage in domestic activities in
the last 12 months).
Two stratifications are made in the analysis to facilitate the interpretation of results.
The first stratification is based on the sector of employment, which relies on the NLSS
definition. We also stratify the sample by skill, whereby individuals having more than 10
years of schooling are characterized as highly skilled and others are considered low skilled.
Individual and household earnings over a 12-month period are used to construct monthly
formal- and informal-sector wages, respectively. We use the national consumer price index to
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convert 2003 wages into 2010 real terms. Monthly wages for formal-sector workers are taken
directly from the survey. For the majority of workers employed in the informal sector, we
proxy for earnings with revenues from own farms and enterprises. To construct individual
monthly earnings, we divide monthly revenues by the number of members in the household
reported to be employed in the enterprise.
Our measure proxy for informal earnings may under- or overestimate true individual
earnings in the informal sector. We might systematically overestimate revenues per capita
by omitting hired employees from the denominator (because they were missing from the
agricultural module). On the other hand, we may underestimate individual earnings because
we are unable to clarify which household members were employed by the enterprise on a
permanent basis.
Because household enterprises are more the rule than the exception, we restrict the
analysis of migration impacts to the sample of household heads. Particularly for the informal
sector, adding members from larger households may attenuate the effect of immigration
inasmuch as their employment status may depend on their relative position in the household
and other joint household decisions. Since restricting the focus to household heads sufficiently
reduces the initial sample size, we detail how heads differ from the rest of the natives in the
Summary Statistics section.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 compares the characteristics of migrants, nonmigrants, and household heads of both
groups in our sample. Migrants tend to be younger and more educated than nonmigrants,
and a greater percentage are women. The proportion of migrants that completed 10 or more
years of schooling is 29 percent, compared with 14 percent of non-migrants in 2003. These
differences widen by 2010, when 46 percent of migrants are considered skilled according to
our definition, compared with 18 percent of nonmigrants. Given the skill differentials, it is
not surprising that a greater percentage of migrants work in the formal sector.
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Restricting the nonmigrant sample to household heads changes the distribution of gender
and age characteristics with negligible effects on educational endowment. Focusing on the
heads produces a sample closer to full employment. As expected, household heads obtain
greater formal- and informal-sector wages on average (than the complete sample of nonmi-
grants), and the difference is persistent over time.
4 Methodology
We employ the Boustan et al. (2010) methodology to account for changes in native labor
market outcomes attributable to immigration, using the following empirical model:
Yijt = α1 + βMjt + λXijt + γQjt + δj + δt + ijt, t = [2003, 2010] (1)
The dependent variable Y represents the non-migrant labor outcomes (employed, unem-
ployed, and log monthly wages) for individual level i, living in area j at time t. Labor supply
and wage variables are a function of several factors: the net labor migration rates M to area
j over the last four years, a vector of demographic controls X that reflect one′s earning po-
tential (age, gender, education), a location variable Q (urban destination), a location fixed
effect δj to reflect labor market differences at the regional level, and a time fixed effect δt
to account for time trends. Errors are clustered at the district level, for the 69 districts, to
allow for correlation between individuals within district-level labor markets.
To deal with the endogeneity of the net migration rate M , predicted in- and out-migration
rates are used as instruments for the observed net migration rates ( Boustan et al. (2010))10.
We also subtract the predicted out-migration rate from the predicted in-migration rate to
create the predicted net migration rate and use this one instrument for the net-migration
10 We follow Boustan et al. (2010) in how we compute the standard errors in the first- and second-stage
regressions. The first-stage regressions use block-bootstrapped standard errors (clustering at the district
level) to account for the fact that the predicted in- and out-migration rates are generated regressors.
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rate. Thus we have two sets of instruments, predicted in- and out-migration rates together,
or the predicted net migration rate as an instrument for the net migration rate in a just
identified model.
Equations (2) through (4) delineate how the predicted in-migration rate is computed.
Out-migration rates are calculated in a similar fashion to compute net migration rates (equa-
tions (5) through (7)). To compute the in-migration rate for location j, we must first predict
the in-migration flows, IMjt, of migrants to location j. This is the product of the number
of migrants leaving location k and the probability that these migrants move from location
k to location j, P̂kjt, where Ôkt denotes the out-migration rate. The instrument for the
in-migration rate is the predicted inflow in equation (2) divided by district j′s population in
1995. Predicted in-migration flows (equation (2)) are affected only by outmigration in all j







× P̂kjt, with t = [2003, 2010] (2)
Okt = α2 + θ1Zkt−1 + θ2Mkt−1 + δk + δt + kt, (3)
with t = [2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010]
Pkjt = α3 + φf(dkj) + δt + kt, with t = [2003, 2010] (4)
In (3), we modify the out-migration rate, Okt, equation from Boustan et al. (2010) and
later Strobl and Valfort (2013) in three ways. First, the out-migration rate is influenced by
origin weather shocks (floods, droughts and their interaction with river density), as well as
by past conflict events (Zkt−1)12. Although the consistency of our results does not depend
on the addition of these interaction terms and the conflict variables, such modifications are
11The use of migration out of (into) other states excluding own state helps to avoid the issue of endogeneity
as discussed. In addition, excluding own state automatically implies excluding own state lagged weather and
conflict variables used in equation (3) and (6) to predict out(in) migration flows which could indirectly affect
the main dependent variables of the analysis.
12Weather and conflict variables are not used directly as instruments, only to construct predicted in and
out migration rates which are the excluded instruments used in the analysis
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motivated by the vulnerability of Nepali households to floods, as described in Section 2.
Second, we estimate out-migration flows using a linear probability model with district and
time fixed effects. Third, we improve the predictive power of out-migration rates by estimat-
ing a dynamic model, incorporating lagged migration rates. A standard system generalized
method of moments (GMM) dynamic model (Blundell and Bond (1998)) is applied with ro-
bust standard errors.13 The predictive power of the dynamic model is assessed against an
alternative model, ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors robust to time and
spatial correlation (Conley (1999)). We assume that spatial dependency disappears beyond
a cutoff point of 64 kilometers, which corresponds to the maximum distance between the
centroids of any pair of neighboring districts. We also allow for time dependency of up to
two years, which is larger than the minimum time lag (T powered 0.25) recommended by
Green (2003) and Hsiang (2010).
For each source location k, the probability of moving from location k to location j is
then estimated by a dyadic model in equation (4), which depends on the proximity between
locations k and j, djk. We define the proximity as a Euclidian distance between locations and
allow for a nonmonotonic relationship with the introduction of a quadratic term. We estimate
(4) using a linear probability model with time fixed effects δt to account for unobserved time-
specific variables that influence migration. Standard errors are clustered at the origin level.
Thus far, we have explained how we predict in-migration rates. We must also predict
out-migration rates to have the complete set of variables used as excluded instruments in
equation (1) . Out-migration rates are computed in a similar fashion from equations (5)-(7)
13 The method provides more efficient estimates than difference GMM estimations (Arellano and Bond
(1991)) but requires an additional assumption with respect to stationarity. We apply Fisher′ test for panel
unit root using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Maddala and Wu (1999)). For our main variables reported
in Table 5.2, we can reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity in all variables at any reasonable confidence
level. One exception is the number of conflicts per square kilometer, but note that that our results do not









× P̂jkt, with t = [2003, 2010] (5)
Ikt = α2 + θ1Zkt−1 + θ2Mkt−1 + δk + δt + kt, (6)
with t = [2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010]
Pjkt = α3 + φf(djk) + δt + kt, with t = [2003, 2010] (7)
Equation (5) denotes the predicted out-migration flow OMjt of migrants from location
j. The predicted out-migration flow from j is estimated as the sum over all destination
districts k (k 6= j) of the number of migrants settling in destination district k who are
estimated to come from source district j. Equation (6) provides the predicted in-migration
rate for districts estimated in a similar form to equation (3). From (7), a function of distance
across districts is used to estimate the likelihood of individuals leaving source region j to
move to region k. Predicted district level observations of Pjkt and Ikt from equations (6)
and (7) are used to create predicted out-migration flows in (5). The predicted out-migration
flow from location j is divided by district j′s population in 1995 to create the predicted
out-migration rate used as an instrument, along with the predicted in-migration rate in the
empirical estimation.
Our identification strategy hinges on the assumption that the predicted out-migration
rates, predicted in-migration rates and predicted net migration rate affect individual labor
market outcomes at the destination only through their effect on net migration.14 By fo-
cusing on district-level migration rates, we essentially reduce the potential for the exclusion
restriction to be violated due to the spatial correlation of shocks across cities and villages
within the same district. Furthermore, by including district fixed effects, we control for un-
observed factors at the destination that might be correlated with net migration and affect
labor market outcomes.
14 The average net migration rate (Table 5.2) is slightly lower than rates observed in the US literature but
within the realm for internal migration in developing countries (Strobl and Valfort (2013)).
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The only credible threat to identification would come from spatial correlation between
the variables used to predict net-migration rates from sending districts and unobserved
local labor market conditions at the district level ( Boustan et al. (2010); Pugatch and Yang
(2011)). This is certainly one rationale for lagging these variables when predicting in- and
out-migration. Yet we cannot rule out that (lagged) political and environmental shocks are
correlated across districts and feature enough persistency to threaten the validity of the
exclusion restriction. We will therefore test the robustness of our analysis in Section 5.3 by
augmenting the regressions in equation (1) with spatially lagged political and environmental
shocks that explicitly control for spatial correlation across districts.
5 Results
5.1 Results from the Regressions Used to Predict Net Migration
Rates
We first present the parameter and standard error estimates from the OLS version of (3)
(column 3, Table 5.1). An increase of 1 standard deviation (that is, by 0.387) in flood
incidence during the heavy monsoon (i.e. 0.387) reduces the out-migration rate by 0.0009
(at mean river density).15 Given the mean value of the out-migration rate (0.005), the
impact corresponds to a reduction of 18 percent. However, flood exposure, particularly
in areas with dense river networks (floods*river density), can push individuals out of their
locations of origin. For example, consider individuals living in areas where the river density is
2 standard deviations above the mean. An increase of 1 standard deviation in flood incidence
elevates their chance of out-migration by 3 percent.
Inferences on the flooding parameters are similar when based on the dynamic model
(column 6, Table 5.1). At the cost of imposing an additional assumption with respect to
15 Descriptive statistics for district-level variables, which are used to compute the average partial effects,
are given in Table 5.2.
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the exogenous nature of past migration,16, the dynamic model is found to offer a better
specification fit. The F-test of joint significance in the first-stage equation is slightly higher
for the instruments resulting from the dynamic model. Our instrumental variables (predicted
migration rates) and the interpretation of the remaining parameters are therefore based on
our preferred specification, the dynamic model.
A major advantage of the dynamic model is the ability to control for auxiliary factors that
affect historical migration rates. To give perspective on the relative importance of flooding
on out-migration rates, auxiliary factors, as proxied through the lagged out-migration rate,
influence out-migration rates by a similar order of magnitude. An increase of 1 standard
deviation in historical out-migration rate augments out-migration rates by 22 percent com-
pared with an 18 percent reduction from an equivalent increase in flooding exposure. While
the number of conflicts also has a consistently positive effect on out-migration rates, the
effects are smaller with an increase of 1 standard deviation, leading to a 6 percent increase
in out-migration rates.
We briefly remark on the in-migration rate regression (column 12, Table 5.1). Lagged
migration is the only statistically significant determinant. An increase of 1 standard deviation
in historical in-migration rates is predicted to increase in-migration by 62 percent, reflecting
strong network effects.
We next turn to the models used to predict the probabilities of moving from district k to j
and vice versa (4). Both specifications suggest a convex relationship between the probability
of moving and distance: the probability is almost always negatively correlated with the linear
term (for 124 and 127 of the 138 estimated pairs in Pkj and Pjk, respectively) and positively
correlated with the squared term (for 132 and 136 of the 138 estimated pairs in the same two
specifications). The small sample of district pairs, however, influences the precision of our
estimates. About 25 percent of the coefficients on the linear and squared distance variables
16 To validate the consistency of the GMM estimator, the test for the first-order serial correlation rejects the
null hypothesis of no correlation, while the hypothesis for second-order serial correlation cannot be rejected.
The Sargan test for over identification does not reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the
instrumental variables and the error term.
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are statistically significant at the 10 percent critical level in both probability specifications.
Table 5.3 presents the results from the first-stage regressions. Predicted migration rates
calculated from formula (2) for in-migration (and a similar formula for out-migration) are
used as instruments for actual net migration rates. We also provide a just-identified version
of the first stage, using the predicted net migration rate as one instrument subtracting the
aforementioned two formulas.
Figure 5.1 maps the predicted and observed net migration rates. Although strongly
correlated in areas with major cities, the two maps substantially differ in that the predicted
figures capture a subsample of the observed net migration rates. For Kathmandu, actual
and predicted net-migration rates are strongly correlated. Actual net migration rates were
0.020 and 0.117, while predicted net migration rates were 0.023 and 0.064 in 2003 and 2010,
respectively. In other cities, such as Nepalganj in the southwestern Banke district (Figure
5.1), the distinction between actual and predicted migration is much larger. The actual net
migration rate is 0.046 and 0.010 in contrast to the predicted net migration rate of -0.003 and
-0.004 in 2003 and 2010, respectively. The striking differences across predicted and observed
net migration rates highlight that the interpretation of our results is not generalizable to any
type of migrants in Nepal.
5.2 Impact of Migration on Hosting Labor Markets
We now present our estimates of the impact of net migration rates on labor markets outcomes.
In Table 5.4, our dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly real wage, distinguishing
between the formal and informal sectors. The two-stage least-squares estimates under just-
identified (column 5) or over identified (column 6) equations indicate a strong negative
impact in the formal sector. A 1 percent increase in net migration rates would translate into
a fall in real wages by about 5 percent. Contrary to the findings of Kleemans and Magruder
(2012), the negative impact is found only in the formal sector. These effects are consistent
with migrants’ being engaged in activities in the formal sector more than nonmigrants.
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The formal-sector wage effects for each district are extrapolated from the regression
results and presented in Figure 5.2. A 1 percent increase in net migration rates from increased
frequency of droughts, floods, and conflict in this part of the world is expected to have
profound effects on the economic geography of Nepal. There is quite a bit of variation in
the wage effects across space which corresponds to district migration hot spots depicted in
Figure 5.1, which suffers the most negative consequences.
Our descriptive statistics also reveal that the difference between migrants and nonmi-
grants may be driven by distinctions in skills: in 2010, 46 percent of migrants were considered
skilled compared with 18 percent of nonmigrants. It is therefore not surprising to observe
that net migration negatively affects the real wages of high-skilled nonmigrants (columns 1-3,
Panel A, Table 5.5), in particular in the formal sector where most (relatively) high-skilled
migrants are competing (columns 7-9, Panel B, Table 5.5). The magnitude of the wage effect
resembles wage losses in the context of labor substitutability among low-skilled workers in
the United States (for example, 1-2 percent declines found by Altonji and Card (1991) or
Ottaviano and Peri (2012)). Nonetheless, the negative impact found in the formal sector for
the low-skilled workers (columns 10-12, Panel B, Table 5.5) sheds doubt on a mechanism
exclusively based on labor substitutability.
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 point to another source of vulnerability for low-skilled workers. Low-
skilled workers face a lower probability of employment (columns 14 and 15, Table 5.6) and
a higher probability of unemployment (columns 8 and 9, Table 5.7). Raising net migration
by 1 percentage point increases the unemployment of unskilled workers by 1.5 percentage
points. A slightly lower (reverse) elasticity is found for employment probability. Similarly,
employment and unemployment probabilities have the expected sign for skilled workers,
although statistically significant for the probability to be unemployed (columns 5 and 6,
Table 5.7). Such contrasting results are consistent with a displacement of low-skilled workers
out of the labor market.
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5.3 Validity of the Instruments
The identification strategy hinges on two main identifying assumptions: the strength and
the exogenous nature of the predicted net migration rates used as instruments. First, the
individual t- and F-tests, assuming weak instruments, indicate the instruments are strong
predictors of the actual net migration rate (Table 5.3). The Kleibergen Paap rk Wald F
statistics range between 12 and 14 for our preferred dynamic specification, which exceeds
the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values with 15 percent absolute bias.17 We also note that
the predicted net migration rates positively affect observed net migration rates, which is
reassuring given that just-identified estimates are median-unbiased.
Second, it is intuitively plausible that the predicted migration rates affect labor market
outcomes only through observed migration rates. In Section 4, we rationalize the focus of
the analysis at the district level and the use of lagged environmental and political shocks in
predicting migration rates to satisfy the exclusion restriction. One possible violation of the
exclusion restriction would nonetheless result if (weather and political) shocks in neighboring
districts have direct impacts on labor market outcomes.18 We therefore test the stability of
our coefficients of interest in the second-stage regressions to the inclusion of spatially lagged
variables. The spatially lagged variables are obtained by multiplying the variables used
to predict migration in equation (3) with a distance-based spatial matrix that weights the
value of each variable for one district by the inverses of the Euclidean distances to the
geographical centers of all other districts (Anselin (2002)). The inclusion of these spatially
lagged variables does not alter substantially the magnitude of the impact of migration on
labor market outcomes.19 We can therefore rule out the possible threat to our identification
17 The F statistics on excluded IV is also above the rule-of-thumb of 10 provided by Stock and Yogo (2005).
We also note that when using the predicted out-migration and in-migration rates as separate instruments,
the Hansen J test features a p-value above 0.100. It should be noted that the two instruments are similar in
nature and the test assumes that at least one instrument is valid.
18 Past migration in equation (3) may also be endogenous. Our results are similar when past migration is
omitted and the instruments are constructed using an OLS estimation (as shown in columns 1-3 and 7-9 in
Table 5.1). The robustness of the two-stage estimates is provided in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix.
19 Results are provided in Table A.3. There is only one exception : the impact on wages for the low-skilled
workers appears to be positive when spatially lagged variables are included. However, when restricted to the
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strategy that would result from spatial spillovers from environmental and political shocks.
5.4 Reflections on the Role of the Informal Labor Market in Ab-
sorbing Displaced Workers
The seemingly contrasting results between employment and wage outcomes deserve further
investigation. The displacement of low-skilled workers out of the labor market cannot be
explained by the labor substitution mechanism. First, immigration may change demand in
ways differentially affecting formal- and informal-sector workers (Altonji and Card (1991)).
For example, a growing literature demonstrates immigration influences prices and consump-
tion composition (Saiz (2003)Saiz (2007); Lach (2007); Cortes (2008)). Second, although our
findings are somewhat consistent with the predictions of Kleemans and Magruder (2012), our
informal-sector results suggest binding constraints preclude the absorption of workers (for
example, registration requirements may prevent the entry of new enterprises, or credit con-
straints prevent enterprise expansion). We reflect on the plausibility of these hypotheses
descriptively.20
We first examine whether native workers change their consumption patterns in response
to migrant flows. It is important to note that the general equilibrium framework developed
by Altonji and Card (1991) accounts for the increase in the demand for goods caused by the
shift in the population from migration. We explore an additional effect on labor demand,
which is through shifts in preferences for goods. If the purchasing power parity of workers
declines with immigration, then we might expect to observe changes in consumption patterns.
While total consumption remains unaffected by migration, native workers reduce the share
formal sector, we found a negative impact, similar to the one found in Table 5.5 (columns 11-12).
20 These hypotheses are by no means exhaustive. The skilled may be differentially affected if migration
affects innovation and technology boosting their marginal productivity (Kerr (2013)). Additionally, from
a worker’s perspective, the returns to his skills or education in the informal sector may be lower than his
reservation wage, rendering unemployment more desirable than employment in the informal sector. Although
testing the role of migration in innovation is beyond the scope of the paper, we find no descriptive evidence
to support the reservation wage argument when comparing the returns on education across sectors in simple
Mincerian wage regressions (Table A.4 in the appendix).
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of service goods consumed in exchange for other nonfood essentials (Table 5.8). These
compositional changes in demand do not explain labor market exits in the informal sector,
but they do offer one explanation for why formal-sector workers are at most risk. A greater
share of formal-sector workers are engaged in the service sector, in which services are likely
to have a higher elasticity of demand.
We next assess how constraints on the creation and expansion of enterprises may affect the
ability of the informal sector to absorb displaced workers. Descriptive statistics indicate that
the majority of enterprises are financed through households’ own savings (approximately 40
percent) (Table 5.9). Only a small percentage of enterprises tried to obtain a loan to operate
or expand their business (23 percent in 2010) and fewer complained of unsuccessful attempts
(3 percent). Overall, the environment for hired labor is low (for example, only 17 percent
in 2010). Informal enterprises are more inclined to hire workers and a significantly greater
number of workers per enterprise. The absence of financial capital may discourage enterprises
in the informal sector from expanding or entrepreneurs from creating start-ups.
6 Conclusion
We employ the Boustan et al. (2010) multi-stage procedure to identify the effects of environ-
mental migration on the labor markets of hosting communities. We modify these authors’
procedure for constructing the instrumental variables to incorporate additional variables rel-
evant to our setting (such as conflict exposure), district and time fixed effects, and a dynamic
component. We show the dynamic model is preferred to the standard OLS accounting for
spatial and time correlation (Conley (1999)). Inferences based on the dynamic model sug-
gest droughts and floods are equally crucial determinants of migration as auxiliary factors,
proxied by lagged migration. Predictions from the dynamic model are used to construct
instruments for net migration rates in the second stage.
Our second-stage regressions indicate wage losses are slightly larger than those observed
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in the United States and elsewhere (4.8 percent). Labor substitution is imperfect in the
Nepal case inasmuch as migrants appear more skilled than the average native worker in
hosting communities. The demand for labor in the formal sector also appears binding in the
short term following earlier work in Indonesia (Kleemans and Magruder (2012)). Imperfect
substitution coupled with fixed labor demand in the formal sector may partially explain why
wage losses are more pronounced here than in other settings.
Although migrants are positively selected, as in Indonesia, we find informal-sector em-
ployment (not wages) is negatively affected. The wages of the informal sector adjust due
to the exit of workers from the labor market. Migration appears to change consumption
patterns by reducing the share of service goods consumed. Service goods may have a higher
elasticity of demand. Furthermore, formal-sector workers are at greater risk than informal-
sector workers since a greater share are employed in the service sector. The informal sector’s
ability to absorb excess labor may also be limited by opportunities to access financial capital
in Nepal to support new enterprises or encourage older enterprises to grow. Such descriptive
evidence suggests the provision of grants to support enterprises following periods of disasters
may foster resilience in hosting economies to forced migration (de Mel et al. (2012)).
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Table 2.1—Summary statistics, individual characteristics of migrants and natives aged 18-65,
weighted, 2003 and 2010
2003 2010 2003 2010
Non- Migrant Diff. Non- Migrant Diff. Non- Non-
migrant migrant migrant migrant
(p-val) (p-val) HH head HH head
(n = 7,303) (n = 241) (n = 14,367) (n = 401) (n = 2,742) (n = 5,230)
Age 36.70 28.50 0.000 37.80 25.70 0.000 43.40 43.70
(13.60) (11.60) (13.60) (10.10) (11.60) (11.50)
Male 0.53 0.43 0.000 0.43 0.24 0.000 0.85 0.72
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.43) (0.36) (0.45)
Schooling 3.69 6.52 0.000 4.25 8.24 0.000 3.36 3.98
(4.57) (4.71) (4.81) (4.58) (4.36) (4.51)
Highly skilled 0.14 0.29 0.174 0.18 0.46 0.000 0.12 0.14
(0.34) (0.46) (0.39) (0.50) (0.32) (0.35)
Labor Variables
Employed 0.90 0.75 0.358 0.84 0.58 0.152 0.97 0.94
(last 12 months) (0.30) (0.43) (0.37) (0.50) (0.17) (0.24)
Unemployed 0.03 0.07 0.000 0.13 0.26 0.000 0.01 0.06
(last 12 months) (0.18) (0.25) (0.34) (0.44) (0.12) (0.23)
Inactive 0.07 0.18 0.000 0.03 0.16 0.375 0.02 0.004
(last 12 months) (0.25) (0.39) (0.17) (0.37) (0.13) (0.06)
(n = 6,572) (n = 180) (n = 12,068) (n = 233) (n = 2,660) (n = 4,707)
Work primary job 0.26 0.32 0.084 0.20 0.27 0.027 0.31 0.23
(|empl. in formal) (0.44) (0.47) (0.40) (0.44) (0.46) (0.42)
(n = 1708) (n = 57) (n = 2,413) (n = 63) (n = 798) (n = 1,080)
Real wage 10,276 10,221 0.996 13,445 8,653 0.569 14,765 17,582
(|empl. & formal) (80,981) (18,267) (63,605) (8,107) (114,300) (89,454)
(n = 2,713) (n = 84) (n = 5,700) (n = 75) (n = 1,323) (n = 2,034)
Real wage1 1,566 1,584 0.912 3,245 4,049 0.783 1,890 3,676
(|empl. & informal) (5,561) (2,919) (24,501) (10,973) (7,301) (27,204)
Share of Migrants by Industry
(n = 5,960) (n = 151) (n = 9,901) (n = 173) (n = 2,484) (n = 4,264)
Agriculture, 0.70 0.52 0.71 0.53 0.70 0.67
Forestry & Fishery (0.46) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.46) (0.47)
Services 0.17 0.39 0.20 0.35 0.18 0.22
(0.38) (0.49) (0.40) (0.48) (0.38) (0.41)
Manufacturing 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05
(0.26) (0.27) (0.22) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23)
Construction 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06
(0.21) (0.13) (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) (0.24)
Notes: Real wages expressed at the monthly level in 2010 rupees. Highly skilled is defined as having
10 or more years of schooling. HH = Household. 1 Real monthly wage for individual in informal sector
constructed using agricultural or enterprise revenues per worker. 2 Real monthly wage for Household


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.2—Descriptive statistics for district-level variables, periods 2000 to 2003 and 2007
to 2010 (districts = 69, n = 552)
Mean St. dev. Fisher’s test
Flood during heavy monsoon (unweighted) 0.183 (0.387) 329***
Drought during heavy monsoon (unweighted) 0.308 (0.462) 443***
Total conflicts per square km 0.002 (0.009) 120
River density (length of river per square km) 0.171 (0.023) 343***
Actual migration outflow rate from district 0.005 (0.007) 358***
Actual migration inflow rate to district 0.003 (0.005) 329***
Aggregate actual net migration rate (cum. 4-year) 0.005 (0.031)
(weighted by sample size in each district)
Note: ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
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Table 5.3—Relationship between predicted and actual migration rates (first stage)
Actual net migration rate
Dependent variable Dynamic model OLS model
IV(1) IV(2) IV(1) IV(2)
Predicted net migration rate 1.459*** 2.107***
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.533) (0.668)
Predicted out migration rate -0.580** -4.829
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.241) (5.123)
Predicted in migration rate 1.918*** 2.165**
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.672) (0.862)
Individual age -0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Individual male 0.00008 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Individual education years -0.0000 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Urban 0.00015 0.00017 0.00025 0.00034
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 24.235 24.235 24.235 24.235
R-Squared 0.598 0.652 0.646 0.652
Number of districts 69 69 69 69
F-stat 58.28*** 63.92*** 61.67*** 64.5***
F-stat on excl. IV 13.86*** 12.53*** 23.003*** 13.34***
Weak identification testa 13.784 12.464 22.861 13.223
Stock-Yogo critical values
10 percent maximal IV size 16.380 19.930 16.380 19.930
15 percent maximal IV size 8.960 11.590 8.960 11.590
Notes: Time and district fixed effects are included. a The weak identification
test provides the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic.
Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped and clustered at the district level.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.5—Effect of net migration rate on wages for nonmigrant household heads aged 18-65,
by skill (second stage)
Dependent Variable Log monthly real wages (2010 Nepal rupees)
OLS IV(1) IV(2) OLS IV(1) IV(2)
Panel A All sectors
High skill Low skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net migration rate -1.940* -1.253 -1.202 -0.6378 4.615 3.431
(cumulative 4-yr) (1.068) (1.453) (1.438) (1.133) (4.638) (3.961)
Individual control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupation Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,075 1,075 1,075 4,154 4,154 4,154
R-squared (within) 0.464 0.464 0.464 0.480 0.478 0.479
Panel B Formal sector
High skill Low skill
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Net migration rate -1.675** -1.518* -1.593** -5.397*** -4.655*** -5.376***
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.705) (0.818) (0.790) (0.745) (1.326) (0.939)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupation Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 573 573 573 1,530 1,530 1,530
R-squared (within) 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.250 0.250 0.250
Number of districts 45 45 45 66 66 66
Notes: Time and district fixed effects included. Standard errors, clustered at the district
level, in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. High skill refers to those





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.8—Effect of net migration rate on nonmigrant household expenditure patterns
OLS IV(1) IV(2) OLS IV(1) IV(2)
Panel A Log per capita total Share food expenditures
Expenditures (real 2010 rupees) (real 2010 rupees)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net migration rate -0.549 1.133 1.105 0.003 0.031 0.016
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.436) (1.504) (1.539) (0.146) (0.163) (0.167)
Individual control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupation dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965
R-squared (within) 0.449 0.447 0.447 0.242 0.242 0.242
Number of districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
OLS IV(1) IV(2) OLS IV(1) IV(2)
Panel B Share nonfood expenditures Share services expenditure
excl. services (real 2010 rupees) (real 2010 rupees)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Net migration rate 0.555*** 0.855*** 0.879*** -0.558** -0.886*** -0.895***
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.117) (0.188) (0.191) (0.225) (0.147) (0.126)
Individual control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupation dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965
R-squared (within) 0.356 0.355 0.354 0.065 0.064 0.063
Number of districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
Notes: Time and district fixed effects included. Standard errors, clustered at the district level,
in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 5.9—Nonmigrant household financial and capacity constraints of enterprises ( | own
enterprise), weighted, 2003 and 2010
2003 2010 2003 2010
All All Low High Low High
skill skill skill skill
(n=865) (n = 1,854) (n = 695) (n = 170) (n = 1,469) (n = 385)
Is the enterprise registered 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.54 0.15 0.48
with the govermnent? (yes) (0.40) (0.41) (0.35) (0.50) (0.36) (0.50)
What was the main source of money for setting up the enterprise?
Didn’t need any money 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.21 0.35 0.20
(0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.41) (0.48) (0.40)
Own savings 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.53 0.37 0.41
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49)
Relatives or friends 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.16
(0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.30) (0.34) (0.37)
Bank (agricultural, 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.11
commercial, Grameen type) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.31)
Other financial institution 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.08
(0.12) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.27)
Other 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.21)
Have you tried to borrow money to operate or expand your business in the past 12 months? (relative to no)
Yes, successfully 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.22 0.31
(0.40) (0.42) (0.40) (0.39) (0.41) (0.47)
Yes, unsuccessfully 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20)
Did you hire anyone over 0.13 0.17 0.11 0.30 0.14 0.35
the past 12 months? (yes) (0.34) (0.38) (0.31) (0.46) (0.34) (0.49)
How many workers do you normally hire during a month when the enterprise is operating?
( | hired in last 12 months) 8.88 9.98 4.99 17.80 11.00 7.84
(32.10) (38.60) (20.60) (48.20) (42.80) (28.40)
What problems, if any, do you have in running your business?
No major problem 0.35 0.49 0.36 0.30 0.51 0.38
(0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.46) (0.50) (0.49)
Caiptal or credit problem 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.16
(0.36) (0.34) (0.35) (0.41) (0.33) (0.36)
Lack of customers 0.31 0.14 0.32 0.24 0.13 0.17
(0.46) (0.34) (0.47) (0.43) (0.34) (0.37)
Other 0.18 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.30








































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.2—Effect of net migration rate on wages using alternate instruments derived from
adjusted OLS method for nonmigrant household heads aged 18-65, by skill (second stage)
Dependent Variable Log monthly real wages (2010 Nepal rupees)
IV(1) IV(2) IV(1) IV(2)
Panel A All sectors
High skill Low skill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net migration rate -1.444 -1.794 2.403 2.309
(cumulative 4-yr) (1.368) (1.229) (3.405) (3.359)
Individual control Y Y Y Y
Occupation dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,075 1,075 4,154 4,154
R-squared (within) 0.464 0.464 0.479 0.480
Number of districts 60 60 69 69
Panel B Formal sector
High skill Low skill
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Net migration rate -1.7355** -1.7758** -5.8440*** -5.9253***
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.807) (0.808) (0.828) (0.803)
Individual control Y Y Y Y
Occupation dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 573 573 1,530 1,530
R-squared (within) 0.171 0.171 0.250 0.250
Number of districts 45 45 66 66
Notes: Time and district fixed effects included. Standard errors , clustered
at the district level, in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
High skill refers to those individuals with at least 10 years of education.
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Table A.3—Testing exclusion restrictions, including spatially lagged weather shock and cli-
mate variables in own district
IV(1) IV(2) IV(1) IV(2) IV(1) IV(2)
Panel A Log monthly real wage (2010 Nepal rupees)
Formal High skill Low skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net migration rate -4.005* -4.107** -7.070 -4.136 18.839*** 19.976***
(cumulative 4-yr) (2.209) (2.041) (8.189) (9.021) (6.931) (7.142)
Observations 2,120 2,120 1,075 1,075 4,154 4,154
R-squared 0.219 0.219 0.112 0.112 0.114 0.113
Number of districts 67 67 60 60 69 69
Panel B Employed (worked in last 12 months)
Formal sector High skill Low skill
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Net migration rate 1.240* 1.497* -1.668* -1.551* -0.956** -1.008***
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.739) (0.829) (0.916) (0.890) (0.377) (0.380)
Observations 7,967 7,967 1,358 1,358 6,604 6,604
R-squared 0.055 0.055 0.088 0.088 0.090 0.090
Number of districts 69 69 64 64 69 69
Panel C Unemployed (worked in last 12 months)
All High skill Low skill
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Net migration rate 1.319*** 1.383*** 1.950** 1.860** 1.305*** 1.381***
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.363) (0.378) (0.850) (0.872) (0.395) (0.406)
Observations 7,965 7,965 1,358 1,358 6,604 6,604
R-squared 0.077 0.077 0.103 0.103 0.079 0.078
Number of districts 69 69 64 64 69 69
Included in Panels A, B, and C
Spatially lagged variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
HH head controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Time and district fixed effects included. Standard errors, clustered at the district level,
in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Spatially lagged variables include
the spatially lagged versions of all weather and conflict variables used in Table 2. HH = Household.
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